

REMARKS

Reconsideration and further prosecution of the above-identified application are respectfully requested in view of the amendment, and the discussion that follows. Claims 1-33 are pending in this application. Claims 20 and 21 have been objected to. Claims 1-4, 10-13, 30, and 32 have been rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Applicant's Admitted Prior Art (AAPA) in view of Refsnes Data ("Refsnes"). Claims 5 and 14 have been rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over AAPA and Refsnes in view of U.S. Pat. No. 6,704,771 to Gough, and Claims 6-7 and 15-16 have been rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over AAPA in view of Refsnes further in view of U.S. Patent No. 6,333,158 to Risley et al. ("Risley"). Claims 8-9, 17 and 18 have been rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over AAPA in view of Refsnes and Risley, and U.S. Pat. Pub. No. 2004/0117376 to Lavin et al. ("Lavin"). Claims 19, 21-26, 31, and 33 have been rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103 as unpatentable over U.S. Pat. Pub. No. 2002/0054139 to Corboy et al. ("Corboy") in view of U.S. Pat. No. 6,484,180 to Lyons, et al ("Lyons"), and claim 20 has been similarly rejected over Corboy and Lyons further in view of U.S. Pat. Pub. No. 2002/0107910 to Zhao. Claims 1, 10, 20, and 21 have been amended. After a careful review of the claims and references, it is believed that the claims are in allowable form and a Notice of Allowance is respectfully requested.

Claims 20-21 have been objected to for incorrect dependence. Claims 20 and 21 have been amended to make them dependent upon claim 19.

Claims 1-4, 10-13, 30, and 32 have been rejected as obvious over AAPA and Refsnes. Claims 1 and 10 have been amended to clarify that the first application is prohibited by the browser same origin policy from communicating data with the second application (see e.g., para. 0004-5). AAPA in Fig. 1 discloses a client machine 10 with three browser instances 12, 14 and

16 each supporting respective applications A, B and X wherein data communications between browser instances 16 and browser instances 12 and 14 is prohibited by the “Same Origin Policy” (see para. 0005), because application X is supported on a different domain X then application A and B (domain A). The Office Action asserts that AAPA discloses a first application associated with a first Internet domain and a second application associated with a second domain. Thus, AAPA does not disclose the claimed embedding of data in an anchor portion of a URL string communicating the URL string, receiving the URL string at the second application, or not causing the performance of a server access (i.e., virtually the entire claim is not disclosed by AAPA). While this is conceded by the Office Action, the Office Action cites Refsnes as disclosing use of HTML links and that an HTML URL anchor can point to any resource on the Web (page 1), and that the anchor tag can create a link that can jump directly into specified section on a page (page 2). The Office Action then argues it would have been obvious to modifying AAPA’s mere disclosure of a first and second application in separate domains so as to “allow embedding data in an anchor portion of a URL string” that identifies a second different domain; it would be obvious that browser instance A (12) in Fig. 1 could have a link to Domain X (26); that copy and paste could be used to copy the link to Domain X and paste it into a Browser Instance X, and it is then implied that the URL is received and extracted; and that the URL is an anchor to Domain X. This process suggested by the Office Action calls for creating a link to the second domain by copying the link to Domain X from Instance A to paste into Instance B so that the URL is an anchor to Domain X. This however does not perform the claimed step of embedding the data to be communicated in an anchor of the URL.

Further, the Refsnes’ reference on page 1 refers to using an anchor tag to create a link to another document or a specific section of the document (page 2) but nowhere describes communicating data between different Internet domains. Refsnes also fails to describe

embedding the data itself into an anchor portion of the URL, rather a URL is embedded in the anchor but the data is not embedded in an anchor portion of the URL of a different domain. Also, the Office Action asserts that the cut and paste link will cause the browser to jump directly without a server access to the portion of the referenced document. However, this is not taught or suggested by the Refsnes' reference which does not mention avoiding a server access when the URL identifies a different domain. Therefore, claim 1-4, 10-13, 30 and 32 are distinguishable over AAPA and Refsnes and are therefore allowable. In addition, dependent claims 5-9 and 14-18 which depend from allowable claims 1 and 10 are similarly distinguishable over all the cited art.


Further, the Office Action argument is the extreme of hindsight reconstruction. The Office Action begins with merely the disclosure of two applications in AAPA, and without disclosure of any of the elements of the claim, attempts to construct the claimed invention using the teaching of the application, based on arguments that modification could be made to "allow embedding", "could have a link", copy and paste "could be used to..." and "it is then implied...". The Office Action merely constructs the claimed invention using the teaching of the application without disclosure of the claim elements in the prior art. Further, the Office Action suggested approach is inconsistent with the claim which calls for the first application to be prohibited from data communication with the second application, while the Office Action states the opposite. The Office Action also fails to explain how the claim is obvious when the prior art browser Same Origin Policy prohibited such data communication.

Independent claims 19, 21-26, 31, and 33 have also been rejected as obvious over Corboy in view of Lyons. Corboy describes a method of establishing a communication path between a client and a host wherein a first and second instance of a browser (the first instance launches the second) communicate with each other by exchanging messages where a java script embedded in

data received from the host rendered by the first browser instance sets up a communication pathway between the two instantiations over which the messages are communicated. However, Corboy does not disclose downloading two embedded applications from one domain to establish two applications associated with two different domains, nor enabling communications between the two different domain client applications. The Office Action concedes that Corboy also does not disclose downloading each application embedded within an Internet domain. The Office Action asserts that Lyons discloses downloading respective applications and the application being embedded in an Internet domain. Claims 19, 21-26, 31, and 33 require downloading, retrieving, or communicating a first and second embedded application from the same domain (i.e., the first Internet domain) to a first and second application associated respectively with a first domain and a second different domain, and providing for communication between the embedded application even though client applications are associated with different domains. However, the combination fails to disclose the embedded application downloaded from the same domain to applications of different domains, and fails to disclose enabling communications between the two different domain applications. Thus, independent claims 19, 22, 26, 31, and 33 are distinguishable over the cited references, as are dependent claims 20, 21, 23-25, and 27-29.

As discussed above, claims 1-33 are not rendered obvious by the cited references. Therefore, allowance of claims 1-33 is believed to be in order and such action is respectfully requested. Should the Examiner be of the opinion that a telephone conference would expedite prosecution of the subject application, he is respectfully requested to telephone applicant's undersigned attorney.

Respectfully submitted,

By: 
James A. Scheer
Reg. No. 29, 434

Dated: July 10, 2008

WELSH & KATZ, LTD
120 South Riverside Plaza, 22nd Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60606
(312) 655-1500 Telephone
(312) 655-1501 Facsimile